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Abstract 
 
 
The paper examines how developing countries can use existing policy space, and enlarge 
it, without opting out of international commitments. It argues that: (i) a meaningful 
context for policy space must extend beyond trade policy and include macroeconomic 
and exchange-rate policies that will achieve developmental goals more effectively; 
(ii)  policy space depends not only on international rules but also on the impact of 
international market conditions and policy decisions taken in other countries on the 
effectiveness of national policy instruments; and (iii) international integration affects 
policy space through several factors that pull in opposite directions; whether it increases 
or reduces policy space differs by country and type of integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of national policies in economic development has long been debated. Much of the 
current debate concerns the concept of “policy space” and focuses on the tension between 
international economic integration and the autonomy available to nation states to pursue 
policies that effectively support their economic development. This tension arises from the 
dilemma of “how to keep the manifold benefits of extensive international economic 
intercourse free of crippling restrictions while at the same time preserving a maximum degree 
of freedom for each nation to pursue its legitimate economic objectives”, as noted by Cooper 
(1968: 5). 
 
Recent concern about the tension between international integration and national policy 
autonomy mainly relates to two factors. First, the policy agenda which many developing 
countries pursued during the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the desired acceleration of 
economic development (e.g. World Bank, 2005). Second, the greatly increased 
internationalization of markets and the associated stronger impact of foreign factors on 
national development have in many instances weakened the effectiveness of domestic 
policies. These factors combined triggered a debate on the commonalities of successful 
growth strategies that could frame the conduct of economic policies and the desirability of 
more proactive policies in development strategies (UN Millennium Project (Sachs Report), 
2005; World Bank, 2005; United Nations, 2007; Commission on Growth and Development 
(Spence Report), 2008). This debate remains unsettled, but it generally emphasizes “that there 
is no universal set of rules” and “that growth entails more than the efficient use of resources” 
(World Bank, 2005: xii and 10). 
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However, it is often perceived that a desire to go beyond attaining the efficient use of 
resources and pursue more proactive policies is faced with a reduced number of effective 
policy instruments. For instance, the outcome of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral 
trade negotiations has extended the scope of multilateral disciplines to include rules that 
impinge directly on domestic policies. This may explain why much of the debate on policy 
space is confined to trade policy and concerned with how the UR agreements restrict the 
sovereignty of nation states to make their own policy decisions (e.g. Gallagher, 2005; 
Hamwey, 2005; Abugattas and Paus, 2006; Brown and Stern, 2006; DiCaprio and Gallagher, 
2006; Kumar and Gallagher, 2007). Most of these studies voice the concern that UR 
disciplines prevent developing countries from following the most effective development 
policies. This may be interpreted as suggesting that developing countries could increase their 
current policy space only by opting out of at least some of their international commitments. 
 
This paper takes a different perspective. It examines how developing countries can effectively 
use existing national policy space, and indeed enlarge it, without opting out of international 
commitments.
1 Its five main arguments are: (i) to be meaningful and pro-development, the 
context for policy space must extend beyond trade policy and include the many non-trade 
(particularly macroeconomic and exchange-rate) policies that will achieve developmental 
goals more effectively; (ii) policy space depends not only on international rules; rather, in a 
globalized world it also depends on the impact of international market conditions and policy 
decisions taken in other countries on the effectiveness of national policy instruments; 
(iii) international integration affects policy space through several factors that pull in opposite 
directions; whether it increases or reduces policy space differs by country and type of 
integration; (iv) policy makers who choose to pursue more proactive policies and broad 
development objectives which privilege real economic variables (e.g. real output and income 
growth) require instruments that allow to: (a) correct for market and government failures; 
(b) manage boom-bust cycles; (c) deal effectively with external shocks; and (v) while the UR 
agreements have introduced restrictions, most of the policy space required to pursue proactive 
development policies is available, and it could be further enlarged by tightening disciplines in 
international monetary and financial relationships. 
 
The theory of economic policy, dating back to Tinbergen (1952), forms the methodological 
framework of the following examination. While this approach may not be applicable as a 
blueprint for contemporary policy-making (van Velthoven, 1990), its basic concepts remain 
useful. Thinking of policy-making in terms of instruments, targets and a model that describes 
the relationship between targets, instruments and other variables is widespread in public 
debate and allows consideration of the operational content of the concept of policy space. 
 
The next section aims at clarifying what is meant by the concept of policy space. Section 3 
examines for what purposes a broad range of policy instruments may be required if policy 
makers choose to pursue more proactive development strategies. It maps the linkages between 
instruments and targets so as to determine broad instrument-target assignments in such a 
strategy. Section 4 uses this mapping to identify areas where actions at the national and 
international levels might allow developing countries to use their existing policy space more 
effectively and to increase it without opting out of international commitments. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
Although not within the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the mere fact of having 
policy space does not imply that it is always put to good use. Some developing countries have 
used their policy space effectively, and they have been rewarded with accelerated 
development, while others have been less able to capitalize on existing policy autonomy. 
Effective use of policy space requires policymakers to have a vision of where they want to 
                                                 
1 Thus, this paper complements discussions on improving WTO rules on special and differential 
treatment for developing countries (see, for example, UNCTAD, 2006: 223–225).  
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take an economy. This, in turn, necessitates the formulation of a national development 
strategy that has a clear understanding of local capabilities, constraints and opportunities, and 
that identifies clear objectives, spells out how policy instruments will be deployed to attain 
them, and establishes effective monitoring mechanisms to determine whether policy targets 
are being met. Widespread scepticism about the institutional capacity of some countries to 
manage a proactive development strategy cannot be ignored. Part of this scepticism is clearly 
justified, given the poorly performing institutional set-ups in a number of countries. 
  
It may be useful to emphasize also what the paper is not intended to do. First, it provides no 
new theoretical insights on consistent policy making. Rather, the paper draws on the literature 
on policy making in developing countries (particularly Rodrik, 2004; and Stiglitz et al., 2006) 
and examines how the type of integration proposed there relates to the policy-space debate. 
The paper focuses on Rodrik (2004) and Stiglitz et al. (2006) because the integration strategy 
proposed by these authors implies a much more proactive role of economic policies than those 
suggested by others. Hence, the findings of this paper may be considered the outcome of an 
extreme case scenario. Second, the paper does not present a country case study which would 
be the only way to identify with reasonable precision how the effectiveness of a feasible set of 
policies is influenced by the structure of the domestic economy, a given global economic 
situation, and by a given domestic and global institutional environment. While this would be 
an interesting area for further research, such an assessment is necessarily determined by 
country- and time-specific factors.
2 
 
 
II. NATIONAL POLICY SPACE OF AN INTEGRATING ECONOMY 
 
The theory of economic policy – initiated by Tinbergen (1952), elaborated from a 
macroeconomic interdependence perspective by Cooper (1968) and Bryant (1980), and 
recently also used in the policy-space debate by UNCTAD (2006) and Akyüz (2007) – has 
been an important basis for addressing the effectiveness of policies in the evolution of a 
national economy.
3 In spite of the many arguments
4 against applying that theory as a 
blueprint, both policymakers and economists who provide policy advice generally adopt, 
explicitly or implicitly, its basic ingredients. Those ingredients are: (i) a set of instruments 
that are subject to direct control by policymakers; (ii) a set of targets that describe the 
evolution of the national economy; and (iii) a model, which describes the economic 
relationships between instruments and targets, as well as the choices available to 
policymakers to attain desired values of the targets by applying specific instruments. Given 
that a multitude of instruments have an impact on the chosen targets and that often there are 
significant time lags before such impacts become measurable, it is useful also to include a 
number of intermediate targets in the model in addition to a small number of ultimate target 
                                                 
2 A possible methodology for such an assessment could be “growth diagnostics” as explained by 
Hausmann, Klinger and Wagner (2008). 
3 The theory of economic policy only addresses what Tinbergen (1952) called “quantitative” economic 
policy, which is distinct from the “qualitative” framework in which policymakers operate. The latter 
describes a country’s economic and political institutional arrangements that have a strong impact on 
incentives and on the behaviour of both policymakers and individuals, and thus on the structural 
characteristics of instrument-target relationships. 
4 Van Velthoven (1990) discusses four major criticisms: (i) rational expectations, suggesting policy 
ineffectiveness; (ii) the Lucas critique, suggesting that the coefficients of the model describing 
instrument-target relationships will in part reflect the specific combination of instruments applied 
during the period over which they are estimated, and thus need not be stable; (iii) information 
constraints and decision costs, which further reduce the certainty with which a given set of instruments 
can attain the targets that define a specific level of social welfare; and (iv) public choice issues, which 
question whether public sector decision-making is an adequate reflection of citizens’ preferences.  
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variables.
5 There are two important rules of the theory of economic policy: (i) the number of 
policy instruments must be at least as great as the number of targets if all targets are to be 
attained; and (ii) in case of trade-offs between target variables, policymakers must use a social 
welfare function to decide which combination of instruments maximizes the degree to which 
a consistent set of targets can be attained. 
 
Policymakers in closed economies have full sovereign command over policy instruments, but 
they may not be able to control specific policy targets effectively. First, potential trade-offs in 
the effectiveness of different instruments, as well as in the objectives sought, make it difficult 
to combine the available instruments in a way that would enable all targets to be attained 
simultaneously (van Velthoven, 1990). Such trade-offs exist in many policy areas, for 
example between full employment and price stability, growth and income distribution or, 
more generally, between efficiency and equity. Second, instruments can be used only within 
specific boundaries (Bryant, 1980: 173). For example, there is a limit to how far nominal 
interest rates can be lowered. Third, the relationships between policy instruments and targets 
are often unstable, and knowledge and information about these relationships are usually 
incomplete. This problem is particularly acute in developing countries where policy aims at 
achieving structural change and thus involves a continuous adaptation of targets, instruments 
and behavioural relations rather than a routine use of a given instrument-target relationship. 
This need for constant adaptation makes it desirable to have available as many effective 
policy instruments as possible (Cooper, 1968: 153–154). 
 
To analyse instrument-target relationships in an internationally integrated economy, it is 
useful to distinguish de jure sovereignty, which involves the formal authority of national 
policymakers over policy instruments, and de facto control, which involves the ability of 
national policymakers to effectively influence specific targets through the skilful use of policy 
instruments (Cooper, 1968: 4; Bryant, 1980: 149–150). On this basis, national policy space 
may be defined as the combination of de jure policy sovereignty and de facto national policy 
autonomy. 
 
This distinction suggests that international economic integration affects national policy space 
through several forces that pull in opposite directions. The process of integration into the 
global economy restricts national policy space in terms of both a reduction in the number of 
available instruments as a result of legal commitments to international rules and practices (i.e. 
constraints on de jure policy sovereignty), and in terms of the reduced effectiveness of 
macroeconomic instruments (i.e. constraints on de facto policy autonomy). At the same time, 
integration enlarges national policy space in terms of de facto control because (i) multilateral 
rules and disciplines enable a coordinated response to cross-border disturbances and prevent 
policymakers in countries that can have a disproportionately large impact on the evolution of 
other economies from adopting discriminatory or beggar-thy-neighbour policies, thus 
restoring part of the effectiveness of domestic instrument-target relationships in 
internationally less influential countries; and because (ii) integration into a larger market 
increases the effectiveness of many structural policies, particularly those whose effectiveness 
strongly depends on scale economies or the disciplines of international competition.
6 
                                                 
5 For example, controlling investment-to-GDP ratios or technology and education levels can be 
intermediate targets for achieving income growth. 
6 The conceptual framework presented by Hamwey (2005) and adopted by Abugattas and Paus (2006) 
distinguishes external and internal policy space. The former is delineated by international agreements 
and market expectations, while the latter is constricted by domestic institutional capabilities and 
resources that define the capacity of a country to implement development policies. A country’s 
available policy space is thus confined to the overlapping of the two sets of policy space. The main 
drawbacks of Hamwey’s framework are that it considers international rules exclusively as constraining, 
thus ignoring the protection that those rules provide against other countries’ beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies, and that it ignores the fact that de facto integration can reduce national policy space with much 
the same effect as a loss of sovereignty through adherence to international rules.  
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The workings of these different forces, which make policy space an issue of finding the right 
balance, can be considered more precisely as follows: 
 
(1) Integration into international economic relationships weakens de facto control over 
national economic development by allowing foreign actions and conditions to influence 
national macroeconomic policy targets.
7 This reduced effectiveness in the ability to control 
national policy targets is most prominent in monetary policy. As national money and capital 
markets are joined by international flows of funds, interest rates tend to converge across 
countries. This can create trade-offs between attaining internal or external targets. For 
example, in response to changes in international financial markets domestic policymakers 
may be compelled to change the level of the domestic interest rate because the relative 
difference in interest rates affects cross-border capital movements. However, such a change 
may result in an absolute level of the interest rate that is inappropriate for attaining domestic 
policy targets. Moreover, with an open capital account both the exchange rate and the interest 
rate are potential policy instruments, but only one of them can actually be employed 
independently.
8 
 
(2) Multilateral rules and disciplines, as well as commitments resulting from bilateral 
agreements, reduce de jure sovereign control over policy instruments. For example, the 
conditionality attached to assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs) reduces 
the autonomy of governments to determine the size of public expenditures, and WTO 
agreements reduce the scope for Member States to impose trade-related performance 
requirements on the granting of subsidies to domestic manufacturers. 
 
These two sources of external constraints on national policy space overlap and reinforce each 
other. On the one hand, integration into international markets reduces the number of 
instruments controlled by policymakers much in the way sovereignty is circumscribed by 
enhanced international rules and disciplines. On the other hand, international rules and 
disciplines weaken the influence of national policy instruments over national policy targets by 
promoting economic integration. 
 
This weakening of sovereignty and of the effectiveness of national instruments over national 
targets must be weighed against the gains from integration into international markets and 
participation in the system of multilateral rules and disciplines. 
  
(3) While de facto integration into international markets reduces the effectiveness of national 
macroeconomic policies, it can improve the effectiveness of many structural policies that are 
of crucial importance for developing countries. Increasing returns to scale on an industry-
wide basis and enhanced technological upgrading are the two main channels that, compared to 
policies in closed economies, make outward-oriented policies more effective in establishing 
competitive industries, thus improving the effectiveness of national sectoral and technology 
policies. For example, technological upgrading in developing countries often depends on the 
availability of foreign technologies embodied in imported capital goods, particularly during 
the initial stages of industrialization. Economic integration facilitates access to foreign 
technologies, and the foreign exchange earned from exporting alleviates the balance-of-
payments constraint. Both these mechanisms combine to reinforce the effectiveness of a 
country’s sectoral and technology policies to build productive capacity and spur productivity 
growth. Regarding financial integration, access to international financial markets enable 
domestic firms to finance investment at internationally competitive conditions, which 
increases the effectiveness of national investment policies. 
 
                                                 
7 Akyüz (2007), following Cooper (1968) and Bryant (1980), discusses the impact of openness on 
macroeconomic policy autonomy in a similar way. 
8 For the distinction between potential and actual policy instruments, see Bryant (1980: 13).  
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(4) Multilateral rules and disciplines can also improve national policy effectiveness.
9 
According to Akyüz (2007: 8), “multilateral rules and disciplines are a form of global 
collective action whereby governments voluntarily agree to reduce sovereignty on a 
reciprocal basis by subjecting their policies in specified areas to certain rules in the 
expectation that such an action would lead to a net benefit”. Ideally, such a system would 
form a coherent set of multilateral arrangements. Its guiding principle would be to manage the 
interface between different national systems, rather than reducing national differences and 
establishing one omnipotent economic and legal structure. 
  
Globalization provides an opportunity for policymakers in influential economies to use 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies. They may be tempted to employ commercial, macroeconomic 
or exchange-rate policies in pursuit of specific national objectives – such as attaining 
mercantilist goals or postponing the adjustment of internal or external imbalances – which 
reduce the effectiveness of national policy instruments in other countries. In the absence of 
multilateral disciplines and cooperation, retaliatory action by adversely affected countries 
could lead to disruptions in international economic relations that might leave all countries 
worse off. 
 
Multilateral cooperation and disciplines can also help maximize global public goods. 
Countries might refrain from undertaking unilateral trade liberalization – for fear of adverse 
effects on their balance of payments and employment – even when they believe that doing so 
would bring efficiency gains. However, they might be willing to undertake multilateral trade 
liberalization because the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination underlying 
multilateral rules give relatively weak countries better protection than they would be able to 
obtain on their own by negotiating bilateral agreements or staying out of any multilateral 
commitments altogether. As far as systemic stability in international money and finance is 
concerned, it is likely that emerging economies will remain vulnerable to currency and 
financial crises as long as the currencies of the major industrial countries remain subject to 
large gyrations. By contrast, macroeconomic policy coordination and multilateral monetary 
and financial disciplines that would ensure stable and well-aligned exchange rates among the 
key currencies would shield weaker and smaller economies from adverse impulses originating 
from monetary and fiscal policies in the major countries. 
 
For global collective action to be acceptable to all parties, it must result from a bargaining 
process based on the full, equal and voluntary participation of all the parties concerned. 
However, there is a natural inclination, particularly by internationally powerful countries, to 
shape multilateral arrangements in a way that gives them maximum flexibility to pursue their 
own goals while restricting the degrees of freedom for others in areas of conflicting national 
interests. Countries that feel disadvantaged by the way multilateral rules and commitments are 
formulated and implemented can, in principle, choose not to participate in or leave the 
multilateral arrangements in question and conduct international relations on a bilateral basis. 
But countries with little power internationally (i.e. the vast majority of developing, as well as 
many developed countries) will not be well-advised to follow this route, because coercive 
action is likely to be even stronger in bilateral relationships with major economic and political 
powers. 
 
To summarize, the tension between international economic integration on the one hand and 
the degree of autonomy available to a country to implement policies that effectively influence 
its economic performance on the other is governed by both its de facto integration into 
international markets and its de jure integration into supranational governance structures. 
How to determine the right balance between maintaining flexibility in national economic 
policy-making and reducing it through multilateral disciplines and collective governance 
remains a contentious issue. On the one hand, the absence of multilateral disciplines can 
                                                 
9 This and the following three paragraphs partly follow Akyüz (2007).  
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disrupt international economic relations and/or bias them in favour of those countries that 
wield substantial economic or political power. On the other hand, an increasing extension of 
legally binding external constraints on national economic policies, including multilateral rules 
and obligations established without the full participation of all countries concerned and biased 
against the interests of some groups of countries, would unduly impinge on the availability or 
effectiveness of national policy instruments. 
 
However, there is no quantifiable single balance between multilateral disciplines and national 
policy autonomy that suits all countries or applies across all spheres of economic activity. The 
maturity of a country’s institutional development, the sustainability of its external accounts, 
its economic size and pattern of domestic production will influence the impact of its 
international economic integration on the effectiveness of national policies. Similarly, at any 
level of economic development, a country’s optimal degree of international integration is 
likely to differ across different spheres such as trade, investment, finance, labour and 
technology. For example, the existence of a functioning domestic financial market and 
previous integration into international goods markets are likely to be significant factors in 
determining the impact of a country’s capital market integration on the effectiveness of its 
monetary and financial policies. Hence, whether international integration increases or reduces 
national policy space is an empirical question for each country and for each type of 
integration. 
 
 
III. LINKING POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND TARGETS IN 
 AN INTEGRATING ECONOMY 
 
One difficulty in applying the instruments-targets approach to real-life policy-making is the 
limited knowledge about the incentive and behavioural structures of individuals, as well as the 
ways in which policymakers react to changes in the structure of the economy or to external 
shocks. Both these aspects, which may be considered as forming part of what Tinbergen 
(1952) called the “qualitative” framework of an economy, are highly location- and time-
specific. Getting better knowledge of this qualitative framework is likely to be one element of 
“development as a discovery process” (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
 
Another difficulty is the absence of a consensus on how the process of growth and 
development is generated and sustained, and how policy instruments and targets relate to each 
other in this process. Most development concepts consider stable and sustained real income 
growth to remain the most important target of economic policy in developing countries.
10 But 
rival concepts embody significantly different analytical views with attendant controversies as 
to what targets policymakers should pursue, how best to describe instrument-target 
relationships, and how de facto and de jure international integration impact on the (effective) 
use of national policy instruments. 
 
Given these differences, it is useful as a first step to map, if only in an illustrative manner, 
what instrument-target relationships try to attain in different policy areas. This section 
develops such a map. The subsequent section uses this map to determine where and in what 
direction national policy strategies and the scope of multilateral rules and disciplines could be 
altered to increase the effectiveness of national policies for attaining growth and development 
targets in an integrating economy. As already mentioned in the introduction, this mapping is 
based on what Stiglitz et al. (2006) call the “heterodox perspective” because the integration 
strategy proposed from this perspective implies a much more proactive role of economic 
policies than, for example, World Bank (2005), the Sachs Report or the Spence Report. 
Hence, the findings of this paper may be considered the outcome of an extreme case scenario. 
                                                 
10 While recognizing that there are broader concepts of development, this paper is limited to a focus on 
longer-term economic growth.  
 
8 
Some of these instrument-target relationships are controversial – as are those of alternative 
perspectives – and their developmental effects clearly depend on country- and time-specific 
factors. Thus, they should not be seen as a blueprint for development strategies but rather as a 
framework that identifies objectives and spells out how policy instruments can be deployed to 
attain them; this, in turn, allows determining which and in what way specific instrument-
target relationships are affected by de facto and de jure integration. 
 
The heterodox perspective criticizes the instrument-target relationships of the reform agenda 
that many developing countries pursued during the 1980s and 1990s as being too narrowly 
focused on monetary stabilization, emphasizing intermediate targets (monetary stabilisation) 
instead of final ones, and using too few instruments (mainly monetary and fiscal policies) due 
to an excessive focus on price stability and allocative efficiency as the key conditions for 
economic growth. It argues that relying on monetary stabilization and efficient use of 
resources ignores the interrelationship between stabilization and growth, as well as the 
potential adverse impacts of international market forces – unleashed through broad-based 
trade and financial integration – on stabilization and growth. Furthermore, it criticizes this 
approach for considering its policy agenda as a blueprint, with insufficient attention given to 
country-specific conditions. In this sense, the heterodox perspective does not prescribe a 
different, yet still globally applicable blueprint. Rather, it represents an alternative perspective 
on policy targets and instrument-target relationships whose operational details and requisite 
reform prescriptions will vary across countries depending on local economic and institutional 
conditions. 
 
The heterodox perspective sees the dynamics of production structures as the engine of growth 
and development. Hence, governments are to pursue macroeconomic policies that combine 
stabilization with growth promotion, and adopt trade and other structural policies that 
encourage investment (both domestic and foreign) which generates new products and new 
production processes and facilitates the creation of linkages among domestic firms and 
sectors. It argues that financial liberalization can rapidly give rise to speculative short-term 
financial flows through which events on international markets and policies adopted by other 
countries can have a disruptive effect on domestic policies. Hence, there is a strong emphasis 
on proactive macroeconomic and structural policies to stimulate productive investment, move 
an economy towards high-productivity sectors and activities, and reduce its vulnerability to 
potential adverse effects from financial liberalization. While policies should aim to achieve 
efficiency gains, they are considered unlikely to spur growth unless they also strengthen 
incentives for innovative investment and address market and government failures that 
undercut efforts to accumulate capital and boost productivity. 
 
Figure 1 suggests a map of instrument-target relationships that aim at maximizing the 
effectiveness of domestic policy instruments in attaining sustained real income growth, 
structural change and technological upgrading; section (iii) of the following narrative 
discusses how multilateral rules and disciplines can support this maximization effort. 
 
It is clear that the map cannot fully reflect the complexity of development policies. For 
example, trade-offs between instruments and/or targets can have important effects on 
outcomes, but this is not reflected here. While the map helps to clarify the specific purpose 
and potential contribution of each instrument, it needs to remain at a rather general level. 
Individual countries will need to calibrate these broad instrument-target assignments to their 
specific economic and social conditions, national preferences and institutional set-ups. 
Combined with the subsequent narrative, the map is, nonetheless, useful in providing broad 
indications on a set of policy instruments and targets available to conduct a consistent and 
coordinated development strategy that aims at sustained real income growth, structural change 
and technological upgrading. The figure reflects the primary link between instruments (in 
squares) and intermediate targets, as well as quantitative measures of these targets, (encircled) 
through double-line arrows, while single-line arrows indicate indirect links. Thick arrows  
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mark links between intermediate targets and the ultimate targets of sustained real income 
growth, structural change and technological upgrading (encircled bold). 
 
 
 
 
A. Macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies 
 
The heterodox perspective considers macroeconomic stabilization and growth policies to be 
closely interrelated. On the one hand, the monetary and fiscal policy mix influences the 
behaviour of real interest rates, exchange rates, output, wages and asset prices, which in turn 
strongly influences investment and savings decisions, as well as the international 
competitiveness of a country’s enterprises. On the other hand, aggregate income growth 
fosters household savings and, through the automatic stabilizers, fiscal accounts, as well as 
productivity growth that enables non-inflationary wage growth. Hence, in order to be 
conducive to productive investment and income growth, macroeconomic stabilization should 
be targeted at real, rather than monetary, variables (such as real output, real interest and real 
exchange rates) and should aim at encouraging and supporting the creation and expansion of 
internationally competitive productive capacity. 
 
Stabilization polices that pay insufficient attention to this broad view of macroeconomic 
stability and the respective trade-offs (e.g. between maximizing anti-inflationary measures 
and minimizing output losses) may fail to generate rapid economic growth. Indeed, 
macroeconomic stabilization with a narrow focus on monetary variables, combined with 
broad-based liberalization, may lead to a peculiar combination of macroeconomic prices  
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(i.e.  high real interest and strong real exchange rates) that fail to increase investment, 
introduce new technologies and expand exports. 
 
The heterodox perspective sees fiscal stabilization is a key instrument for achieving overall 
macroeconomic stability, which in turn provides the foundation for price and exchange-rate 
stabilization. It defines the fiscal anchor (i.e. the fiscal policy target that ensures a sustainable 
and solvency-preserving fiscal policy) in terms of structural balances, and recommends basing 
fiscal programming on a multi-year framework that uses the ratio of fiscal expenditure to 
potential aggregate income.
11 From this perspective, using potential output as a target measure 
keeps inflation and exchange-rate expectations under control, and provides macroeconomic 
stability by eliminating the unwanted effects of cyclical fluctuations on the programming and 
execution of fiscal spending. Overall, using potential output as a target measure is seen as 
helping policymakers develop a mix of macroeconomic disciplines and flexibility to react to 
imbalances in the real economy arising from a significant gap between potential and actual 
aggregate income or from unexpected changes in the business cycle.
12 
 
Tax design and expenditure composition are important transmission channels of the growth 
impact of fiscal policy. Ensuring that the tax system does not distort incentives and shifting 
the composition of expenditures towards more productive uses enhances the growth stimulus 
of fiscal policy at any deficit level. Growth-enhancing fiscal expenditure is usually seen as 
comprising capital expenditure, as well as spending on education, health, and transport and 
communication infrastructure (e.g. Adam and Bevan, 2005). Prioritizing among these 
spending targets to maximize the economic return on government spending will depend on 
country-specific growth constraints. 
 
The heterodox perspective does not view low inflation itself as a policy target because, owing 
to uncertainty about the often only weak link between inflation and real variables, it is 
preferable to focus directly on observable real variables. International integration further 
enhances this uncertainty because the prices of many items produced or consumed 
domestically are increasingly determined by foreign demand and supply factors. Hence, 
inflation becomes less responsive to output gap fluctuations, and monetary policy needs to be 
less restrictive to meet a certain inflation target (Mody and Ohnsorge, 2007). Moreover, 
moderate inflation rates are considered unlikely to impede economic growth. According to a 
wide range of studies, inflation is detrimental to growth only if it is in excess of a certain 
threshold. While there is no agreement on the level of that threshold, it is often considered to 
be around 10 per cent per annum.
13  
 
In addition to the stabilization effects stemming from the monetary and fiscal policy mix, the 
heterodox perspective recommends to achieve price stability through an incomes policy (i.e. 
controlling wage growth as a source of cost inflation by coercing or persuading employers 
                                                 
11 Potential GDP is the level of output that an economy can produce at a constant inflation rate. 
Potential output is country- and time-specific as it depends on the capital stock, the potential labour 
force (which depends on demographic factors and participation rates), the non-accelerating wage rate 
of unemployment (NAWRU) and the level of labour productivity. 
12 Moreover, public revenue stabilization funds pertaining to temporary income from both taxes and 
raw material exports are an important component of a countercyclical policy framework. They help 
generate fiscal surpluses in boom periods and mitigate fiscal restraint during downswings. 
13 Khan and Senhadji (2001) indicate a threshold of 11–12 per cent per annum for developing 
countries; they also discuss the findings of earlier studies which mostly found higher threshold levels. 
The rationale for allowing moderate inflation rates is also based on the strongly adverse economic 
impact of deflation and the fact that monetary policy is ineffective when an economy is in deflation. 
Moreover, there are important trade-offs between rapid disinflation and growth, because with rapidly 
falling inflation high nominal interest rates quickly translate into high real interest rates that discourage 
productive investment and limit growth.  
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and employees to restrict their price and wage increases within a given level of overall 
productivity growth). The easiest way to apply incomes policy is through wage and price 
controls or, in a less interventionist way, by setting wages through centralized collective 
bargaining, where wage agreements are monitored through tripartite agreements between the 
government and employees’ and employers’ associations. Productivity growth in domestic 
production of consumer goods and, more generally, low real prices for wage goods also 
contribute to curbing excessive wage cost increases and spurring growth, as they allow real 
wages to rise without impeding investment and international competitiveness. 
 
With incomes and fiscal policies being the main instruments to control inflation, monetary 
policy can be targeted at economic growth. The following are the immediate targets of 
monetary policy from a heterodox perspective: maintaining interest rates at levels that provide 
domestic credit on terms and conditions that offer appropriate incentives for productive 
investment; maintaining a competitive and stable real exchange rate; and ensuring the 
development and stability of the domestic financial system.
14 At the same time, balance-sheet 
vulnerabilities (e.g. caused by liability dollarization and maturity mismatches) must be 
minimized to foster financial sector stability. Financial development, supported by banking 
and non-bank financial regulations, safeguards most domestic control over policy variables if 
it creates and consolidates domestic-currency-denominated intermediation instruments (e.g. 
bank loans, corporate bonds, securitized assets) that facilitate productive investment.  
 
The heterodox perspective argues that the volatility and pro-cyclical character of short-term 
capital flows requires the prudential management of such capital flows in order to preserve 
macroeconomic stability and allow policymakers to use restrictive monetary policy during 
economic upswings and avoid excessively contractionary policies during slowdowns. The key 
objective of managing short-term capital flows is preventing the cumulative build-up of 
foreign liabilities that can be easily reversed; that is, preventing cyclical upturns in external 
financing from triggering excessive increases in external credit to the domestic private sector, 
preventing capital inflows from causing real exchange rate overvaluation, and controlling 
mismatches in the currency denomination of assets and liabilities in the domestic financial 
sector. Related instruments can be indirect (e.g. prudential regulations) or direct (e.g. reserve 
requirements or taxes on external financing, direct regulation of portfolio flows). Measures 
adopted in the 1990s by Chile and Colombia are often cited as examples of direct instruments 
(Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004).
15 However, in order to make the use of these instruments 
effective, sustainable monetary and fiscal policies must underpin the prudential management 
of short-term capital inflows. 
 
In terms of choosing the exchange-rate regime, the heterodox perspective advises against 
adopting so-called “corner solutions” (i.e. fixed pegs or full floating). In particular, it opposes 
use of the exchange rate as an instrument for disinflation. It sees maintaining a sustainable 
current-account position and stability of the real exchange rate at a level that preserves 
domestic firms’ international competitiveness as the main targets of exchange-rate policy. An 
                                                 
14 Interest rate policy involves a number of trade-offs. It will affect investment only to the extent that 
investment is debt-financed and only when investors see profitable investment opportunities. 
Moreover, controlling exchange-rate fluctuations through interest-rate policy is difficult in financially 
integrated economies because domestic interest rates become heavily exposed to pro-cyclical and 
volatile short-term international financial flows. This in turn risks creating boom and bust cycles in 
domestic asset prices. 
15 The IMF Articles of Agreement allow such controls. Article VI section 3 (Controls of Capital 
Transfers) states “Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital 
movements …”. IMF policy advice may become more favourable towards controlling capital flows. 
According to the Independent Evaluation Office (2005: 6) of the IMF “the IMF has learned over time 
on capital account issues” and “the new paradigm … acknowledges the usefulness of capital controls 
under certain conditions, particularly controls on inflows”. So far, this has not yet been consistently 
reflected in policy advice because of “the lack of a clear position by the institution”.  
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overvaluation and excessive volatility of the real exchange rate are to be avoided in order to 
support export growth with a view to expanding investment and output. While the real 
exchange rate is a relative price, and hence not under the direct control of policymakers, it can 
be influenced by fiscal, monetary, income and capital-account policies, as well as by foreign-
exchange interventions (Eichengreen, 2007; Rodrik, 2008).
16 Choosing soft pegs or managed 
floating as an exchange-rate regime facilitates achievement of these policy targets.
17 
 
B. Integration and structural policies 
 
Regarding the objective of de facto integration, the heterodox perspective emphasizes support 
for the development and continuous upgrading of productive capacity while meeting 
intertemporal budget constraints, rather than narrowly aiming at efficiency gains from 
aligning domestic to international prices. This is to be achieved through strategic integration, 
which compared to rapid and broad-based liberalization is a more measured, selective and 
policy-driven strategy. Strategic trade integration emphasizes the mutually reinforcing links 
between trade, investment and growth. The pace and pattern of trade integration should 
ensure that import liberalization does not cause balance-of-payments problems, and that 
export earnings translate into increased investment. These effects combined are seen to 
improve a country’s manufacturing capacity and productivity, while avoiding growing 
dependence on external capital. 
 
The heterodox perspective considers the creation of the technological capability to 
competitively produce goods previously purchased abroad to be a natural feature of economic 
development. However, due to the multitude of information and coordination failures 
associated with investment and productivity growth, relying on the incentives generated from 
allocative efficiency may not suffice (Rodrik, 2004). Rather, the heterodox perspective 
emphasizes the need for proactive trade and industrial policies to foster nascent industrial 
activity and promote technology transfer and adaptation. Such national policies are not meant 
to be inward-looking, protectionist mechanisms to support industries in which production and 
employment are threatened by foreign competitors that have successfully upgraded their 
production. Rather, they aim to strengthen productive investment. The way in which 
production might be considered for policy support and for how long depends on many factors 
that change in the course of economic development.
18 
 
The range of instruments designed to attain such targets include performance requirements for 
foreign investors, subsidies conditional on export performance to encourage international 
competitiveness of nascent domestic manufacturing, flexible use of compulsory licensing for 
the domestic use of protected foreign intellectual property, a flexible import tariff policy that 
modulates applied tariffs on particular manufacturing sectors around a stable average level, 
and many more. 
 
Rodrik (2004) argues that the aim of proactive trade and industrial policies is not to pick 
winners, but to identify and discipline underperforming firms. Thus, the establishment of 
clear operational goals, time horizons and sunset clauses, as well as the adoption and effective 
                                                 
16 Regarding the question of the real exchange rate as a development policy tool, Eichengreen (2007: 
23; 10) notes that it “is best thought of as a facilitating condition: keeping it at competitive levels and 
avoiding excessive volatility facilitate efforts to capitalize on these fundamentals” and, more generally 
asserts, “it is a useful summary indicator of the growth-friendly or unfriendly stance of economic 
policy”. 
17 As outlined by Bradford (2005: 5–6), choosing managed exchange-rate regimes, combined with 
selective capital controls, also allows for some monetary policy autonomy. Thus, it avoids the 
impossible trinity, i.e. the impossibility to have a fixed exchange rate, a completely open capital 
account and full monetary policy autonomy at the same time. 
18 For detailed discussion see, for example, Rodrik (2004) and UNCTAD (2006: 152–166).  
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monitoring of observable performance criteria is critical to the success of this strategy. In a 
sense, the enforcement of performance requirements, particularly those related to productivity 
gains as imposed by the disciplines of the international market, represents the “stick” that 
complements the “carrot” provided by the creation of rents from productivity-enhancing 
investment supported by temporary subsidies and protection. It is by constraining the use of 
such trade-related performance requirements that, from a heterodox perspective, the UR 
agreements most seriously reduce developing countries’ policy space. 
 
C. Institutions 
 
Regarding institutional arrangements, the heterodox perspective emphasizes that government 
action is a strategic complement to markets. Juxtaposing government and markets, or 
government failures and market failures, would be misleading. Rather, institutions must 
introduce corrective measures against both market failure and government failure. 
Governments need to be made accountable, not bypassed. Institutional change should aim at 
improving checks and balances on government discretion, addressing information and 
coordination externalities, monitoring instrument-target relationships, and managing 
reciprocal control mechanisms designed to minimize abuse of economic rents that are 
inherent to the dynamics of structural change in production and trade. Strategic collaboration 
between the government, business organizations and institutions of learning and innovation is 
an important instrument to this end. 
 
The heterodox perspective sees the main target of de jure integration as reducing exposure to 
adverse external effects, including protection from beggar-thy-neighbour policies adopted by 
other countries. This target is closely related to the overall rationale for multilateral rules and 
commitments, discussed in section 2 above. 
 
The heterodox perspective values the core principles of the multilateral trading regime, 
namely reciprocity and non-discrimination, as reflected in the most-favoured nation rule. It 
supports the WTO in its primary function to provide negotiated, binding and enforceable 
rules, the key benefits of which are the resulting certainty and predictability of international 
trade. Upholding such a system based on multilaterally agreed rules outlaws beggar-thy-
neighbour type trade policies. The heterodox perspective raises concern from a policy-space-
related point of view about the net benefit of bilateral or regional North-South agreements 
because such agreements require developing countries to exchange expected short-term 
benefits from greater export market access and FDI inflows for constraints on the use of 
certain policy instruments including in areas that are no longer (government spending, 
competition policy, investment) or never have been (environmental and labour standards, 
capital account issues) at issue in WTO negotiations (Shadlen, 2005). 
 
 
IV. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO 
 ENLARGE POLICY SPACE 
 
Based on the mapping of instrument-target relationships in figure 1, table 1 links broad policy 
areas to levels of policy-making. The table aims at indicating where policymakers could take 
measures to use existing policy space more effectively and further enlarge their current policy 
space without opting out of international commitments. The basic point of the table is to show 
that such measures would imply a reassessment of instrument-target assignments at the 
national level and a rationalization of multilateral rules and disciplines at the international 
level. This rationalization would entail tighter, rather than looser, multilateral disciplines in 
money and finance. It would aim in particular to control wide deviations from underlying 
conditions of the nominal exchange rates among those countries that have the greatest impact 
on international monetary and financial stability.  
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Table 1 
CONSTRAINTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' POLICY SPACE AND  
MEASURES FOR ITS ENLARGEMENT 
Measures for preserving or enlarging existing policy space 
without opting out of existing commitments 
 
Sources of current 
restrictions on national 
policy space  National measures  International measures 
De facto (particularly 
financial) integration 
 
Loan conditionality of 
international financial 
institutions 
 
Macroeconomic 
policies 
Aid conditionality of 
donors 
Reassessment of policy 
targets and instrument-
target relationships, from 
emphasizing monetary 
stabilization towards 
emphasizing real economic 
variables and the 
interrelationship between 
stabilization and growth-
enhancing policies. 
Tighter multilateral 
disciplines over 
macroeconomic and 
exchange-rate policies of 
countries that have the 
greatest impact on global 
monetary and financial 
stability. Better 
macroeconomic and 
exchange-rate policy 
coordination between key 
currency countries. Regional 
monetary and financial 
cooperation among 
developing countries. 
Reassessment of policy 
targets and instrument-target 
relationships, from 
emphasizing maximization of 
export market access and 
FDI inflows towards 
maximizing creation of 
domestic value added and 
linkages. 
Avoiding further tightening of 
WTO disciplines on  
developing countries' 
industrialization strategies 
and of multilateralisation of 
WTO-plus rules on 
intellectual property rights, 
investment, government 
procurement, etc. 
Structural 
policies: mainly 
trade and 
industrial 
De jure trade 
integration through 
both multilateral 
agreements, and in 
particular bilateral and 
regional North-South 
agreements. 
Avoidance of additional 
constraints from bilateral 
trade and investment 
agreements. 
Tighter WTO disciplines on 
developed-country use of 
trade contingency measures 
(e.g. zeroing in antidumping) 
and agricultural support and 
protection. 
Institutions Developed  countries' 
dominance of 
multilateral norm 
setting and their use of 
their own institutional 
settings as a blueprint 
for national institutions 
in developing 
countries. 
Reorientation from 
efficiency-enhancing to 
growth-enhancing 
institutions. 
Reassessment of global 
economic governance 
structure to allow developing 
countries to become 
proactive norm setters. 
 
 
De jure constraints on developing countries’ policy space are the most pronounced for 
structural policies.
19 The UR agreements account for some of this restriction. Nevertheless, 
these agreements have left some policy space.
20 While the Agreement on Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) risks pre-empting or stifling countries’ ability 
to develop domestic technological capabilities, it does allow flexible use of compulsory 
licensing. The Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS) makes it difficult 
to link investment support to export-related disciplines aimed at withdrawing support from 
producers that do not achieve international competitiveness within a pre-defined period of 
                                                 
19 See Gallagher (2005) for a detailed discussion of the issues addressed in this paragraph. It should 
also be recognized that there are many informal constraints; for example, aid-dependent countries often 
lack the confidence to carry out policies that might conflict with the interests of donors. 
20 This is true particularly for least developed countries, for which transition periods have been 
extended, for example for TRIPS until at least 2016 and for TRIMS until at least 2020.  
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time. But FDI regulating measures that do not violate national treatment or impose 
quantitative restrictions continue to be consistent with WTO rules. The Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures implies a significant tightening of disciplines, but 
some subsidies have been tacitly allowed, with neither developed nor developing countries 
challenging them. There is disagreement as to whether the remaining permitted subsidies are 
sufficient to allow support for industrial development support, but it is clear that fiscal cost is 
a major constraint on many developing countries’ use of such subsidies. Pursuing a flexible 
tariff policy remains possible for many developing countries, although this potential has 
remained largely unexploited. In this respect, possible constraints on flexible tariff policies 
resulting from the Doha Round negotiations might reduce potential, but not current, policy 
space. Developing countries appear to accord greater importance to securing constraints on 
developed countries’ agricultural policy space than to maintaining their own policy space for 
industrial tariffs. Meanwhile, North-South economic integration agreements have resulted in 
further de jure constraints, as discussed in the preceding section. 
 
It is through supposedly sovereign decision that developing-country policymakers sign on to 
the commitments of international trade agreements that reduce de jure policy space. This may 
partly reflect some preference by policymakers for short-term benefits over autonomy in 
deciding on their long-term policy options.
21 But different degrees of influence between 
developed and developing countries on globalization trends and global economic governance 
often confront policymakers with difficult trade-offs. Regarding the commitments stemming 
from the UR agreements, Finger and Nogues (2002) note that at the end of the UR, 
developing countries were faced with the choice of accepting what was proposed or risk being 
marginalized in the international trade regime.
22 As for engagement in North-South 
integration agreements, Baldwin (1997) notes a domino effect: existing North-South 
preferential agreements tempt non-members to join so as not to lose out on access to sizeable 
export markets and sources of FDI. Hence, while engaging in international commitments may 
be a “sovereign” decision, there is often little alternative. 
 
Preserving the remaining multilateral de jure policy space for developing countries to 
undertake structural policies implies that, at the international level, moves to multilateralize 
bilateral and regional trade agreements should not extend to their WTO-plus commitments. It 
also implies that a potential further tightening of WTO rules should emphasize greater 
disciplines on developed countries’ use of trade contingency measures (e.g. the practice of 
zeroing in anti-dumping) and of agricultural support and protection. At the national level, it 
would imply a reassessment of the relative benefits stemming from greater export market 
access and FDI inflows on the one hand, and flexibilities in policies designed to maximize the 
creation of domestic linkages and value added on the other.  
 
In spite of exposing the domestic economy to a number of adverse influences originating in 
international markets, de facto international economic integration preserves significant 
national policy space. As outlined in the previous section, fully exploiting this policy space 
requires a reassessment of policy targets and instrument-target relationships at the national 
level. Such a reassessment, including the use of a greater number of policy instruments, 
would aim at pursuing more pro-active macroeconomic and structural policies while reducing 
                                                 
21 Depending on the relative size of the costs and benefits involved, this may not imply an overall 
negative net benefit, particularly to the extent that policymakers can denounce such agreements after 
benefits have started to accrue while costs have not yet set in, or because they were not intending to use 
the foregone policy space. 
22 According to Finger and Nogues (2002: 334), influential developed countries had announced that 
they would withdraw from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as soon as the WTO 
came into existence. This implied that a country that did not accept the “grand bargain” of the UR 
agreements would not have enjoyed protection from discriminatory treatment, either from the new 
WTO or the old GATT rules and regulations.  
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the vulnerability of the domestic economy to adverse spillover effects of international 
monetary and financial disturbances. 
 
The developmental effectiveness of macroeconomic and structural policies would be 
strengthened by a reorientation of developing countries’ institutional arrangements from 
efficiency-enhancing towards growth-enhancing institutions (Khan, 2007), in particular by 
deploying reciprocal control mechanisms for the effective management of economic rents 
associated with proactive trade and industrial policies. 
 
The effectiveness of reassessing policy targets and instrument-target relationships at the 
national level will be strengthened in particular by adopting appropriate measures at the 
international level aimed at tackling the root causes of international monetary and financial 
disturbances. Unlike the multilateral trading regime, current monetary and financial 
arrangements are not organized around a multilaterally negotiated set of rules that would be 
binding and enforceable for all participants. Existing rules do not seem to offer appropriate 
instruments for tackling major global financial problems such as exchange rate volatility, 
sizeable and prolonged current-account imbalances, and the dominance of short-term 
financial flows over long-term ones. 
 
The Bretton Woods system contained multilateral disciplines to control two main channels of 
exchange-rate instability (Akyüz, 2007). First, restrictions over short-term arbitrage flows 
sought to limit interest-rate arbitrage, and hence the scope of markets to generate unexpected 
and erratic exchange-rate movements. Second, the exchange-rate arrangement implied 
obligations for countries to maintain their exchange rates within a narrow range of agreed par 
values, thus preventing beggar-thy-neighbour policies based on competitive devaluations; but 
it also allowed them to change their par values under fundamental disequilibrium. These 
institutional arrangements allowed the Bretton Woods system to maintain a balance between 
national policy autonomy on the one hand and multilateral disciplines on the other. 
Sacrificing formal monetary autonomy was rewarded by stability in the financial markets and 
better foresight in international trade and in related decisions concerning investment in fixed 
capital. 
 
Following the demise of the Bretton Woods system, strengthened surveillance over national 
policies in IMF Article IV consultations has sought to compensate for the lack of multilateral 
disciplines on exchange-rate policies. However, such disciplines generally have not extended 
to those countries whose policies have the greatest impact on global monetary and financial 
stability. Given that the IMF can exert meaningful disciplines only through conditionality 
built into loan agreements, its policy oversight is confined primarily to its poorest members, 
who need to draw on its resources because of their lack of access to private sources of finance 
and, occasionally, to emerging market economies experiencing currency and financial crises. 
However, IMF surveillance has been unable to prevent exchange-rate gyrations and wide 
divergences from underlying conditions, unsustainable balance-of-payments positions, 
volatile and often speculative short-term capital flows and recurrent financial crises. 
 
While desirable, there is currently little prospect for tightening multilateral rules similar to 
Bretton-Woods-type multilateral disciplines in monetary and financial matters. 
Macroeconomic policy coordination among those countries that have the greatest impact on 
international monetary and financial stability could attain the same objective on a more 
voluntary basis. By aiming at maintaining real exchange rate stability among the key 
currencies, it would help guide expectations that underlie international capital flows and 
hence, reduce the likelihood of unsustainable interest rate differentials and divergences of 
exchange rate from underlying conditions (e.g. Bergsten, Davanne and Jacquet, 1999). 
However, given current disagreement about the root causes, sustainability, need for and type 
of appropriate measures for the unwinding of global imbalances, the prospect for such a 
solution appears to be weak.  
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Strengthened South-South regional cooperation in monetary and financial matters may prove 
to be a more feasible alternative for developing countries to reduce their exposure to adverse 
spillover effects, negative externalities from other countries’ beggar-thy-neighbour policies, 
and short-term interest-rate arbitrage by financial speculators (UNCTAD, 2007). Greater 
regional financial integration, for example through bond and loan issuance in regional 
currencies, could make intraregional financial intermediation more effective and efficient, 
facilitate access to long-term financing, stabilize financial prices, and reduce balance sheet 
currency mismatches, thus promoting regional financial stability. Swap agreements, reserve 
pooling and regional exchange-rate mechanisms, combined with greater macroeconomic and 
financial policy coordination, could secure stability and orderly adjustments of intra-regional 
exchange rates. And regional surveillance over macroeconomic and financial market 
conditions could provide early warning signals. The European experience holds useful lessons 
in this respect, but given its geographic and time-bound specificities, it cannot be considered a 
blueprint for application by developing countries. 
 
Since developing countries have gradually acquired greater weight in the global economic 
arena, they have a stronger need for a commensurate voice and representation in multilateral 
financial institutions. To strengthen the legitimacy of these institutions, key decisions need to 
be based on voluntary, full and equal participation, with an appropriate level of consensus. 
Achieving this will require a reassessment of the global economic governance structure with a 
view to allowing developing countries to become proactive norm setters. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has sought to examine how developing countries can effectively use their existing 
national policy space, and even enlarge it, without opting out of their international 
commitments. This examination leads to five main conclusions: (i) the tension between 
international integration and national policy flexibility is affected by several forces that pull in 
opposite directions; (ii) globalization and the resulting rise in economic interdependence, both 
across countries and policy areas, as well as de jure restrictions to which developing countries 
have signed onto through supposedly sovereign decisions, have altered the degree of freedom 
for national policymakers to design and implement effective national economic policies; 
(iii) whether international integration and regulation on balance increase or reduce the degrees 
of freedom in national policy-making depends on what type of policy instrument is affected, 
by how much and in what direction – the balance is likely to differ across countries and types 
of integration; (iv) there remains considerable policy autonomy in macroeconomic and 
exchange-rate policies. This is particularly true for the increasing number of developing 
countries that have a strong external position – either because of substantial revenues from 
commodity exports or a deliberate accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves – and that are 
no longer (or never have been) subject to IFI or donor conditionality; and (v) effectively using 
existing policy space and enlarging it without opting out of international commitments 
requires action at both the national and international levels. 
 
At the national level, effectively using and enlarging existing national policy space requires a 
reassessment of policy targets and instrument-target relationships with the overall objective of 
employing instruments that allow the combining of stabilization with growth-enhancing 
policies. This entails an emphasis on real economic variables, rather than monetary 
stabilization, choosing an intermediate exchange-rate regime, rather than fixed pegs or full 
floating, and managing short-term financial inflows, rather than aiming at full capital-account 
convertibility. Within a broader outward-oriented development strategy, structural policies 
would use a wide range of fiscal and regulatory policies aimed at achieving high investment 
rates, technological upgrading and structural change. Coherence between macroeconomic and 
structural policies is crucial. A macroeconomic policy stance that leads to high domestic 
interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate is not conducive to investment that can boost  
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productivity growth and improve the international competitiveness of domestic enterprises, 
even when structural policies provide incentives for such investment. Macroeconomic and 
structural policies would need to be supported by institutional arrangements which address 
information and coordination failures that risk undermining entrepreneurial decision-making. 
Such arrangements would also need to improve checks and balances on the use of government 
discretion. 
 
Appropriate action at the international level to reduce the exposure of developing countries to 
adverse spillover effects, negative externalities from other countries’ beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies, and short-term interest-rate arbitrage of financial speculators would significantly 
facilitate national efforts to pursue such macroeconomic and structural policies effectively. 
The best way for achieving this would be to extend the scope of multilateral rules and 
disciplines in the monetary and financial area with a view to curbing speculative short-term 
financial flows and exchange-rate gyrations and controlling wide divergence from underlying 
conditions of the exchange rates of those countries that have the greatest impact on global 
monetary and financial stability. Given the limited prospects for such a multilateral solution in 
the near future, strengthened regional cooperation in monetary and financial matters may be a 
feasible alternative. Both these solutions would bring about greater coherence between the 
international trading and financial systems so that they reinforce, rather than undermine and 
destabilize, one another. 
 
The outlined national and international measures result from an examination of constraints on 
developing countries’ policy space and measures for its enlargement from a heterodox 
perspective of development policy making. Accordingly, perspectives that give less 
importance to proactive macroeconomic and sectoral policies, such as World Bank (2005) or 
the Sachs and the Spence Reports, would argue that there is less of a need for moving away 
from macroeconomic and exchange-rate policy assignments of the 1980s and 1990s, and that 
there is less need for strengthening multilateral rules and disciplines in the area of money and 
finance. 
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